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REVIEW ESSAY: OF DISSENT AND DISCRETION
Glenn Harlan Reynoldst
JURY NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF A DocTRNE. By Clay S. Con-
rad.tt Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1998. Pp. 311. ISBN:
0890897026
INTRODUCTION
They tried to kill my brother. After beating a man whom they had
picked at random and leaving him in a parking lot, my brother's attackers
were fleeing the scene. They piled into a Honda Accord and started the
engine. My brother, along with several of his friends, saw them and gave
chase. More brave than sensible, my brother placed himself in front of
the car to block their escape. "Ruri the motherfucker down," one of the
car's occupants reportedly said. And that's what they did, though mirac-
ulously my brother escaped without serious injury.
Witnesses got the license number, and eventually the case came to
trial. Though guilt was clearly established, both by eyewitness testimony
and a confession, my brother's tormentors never did any jail time. They
were put on the street by people who didn't think that aggravated assault
and attempted murder were a reason for these young men - one of them
the son of an executive at a prominent local company - to go to jail. Jury
nullification? Oh, no. It was a plea bargain by prosecutors approved by
a judge who tried to talk my brother out of bringing the case at all. "It's
pretty hard to put people in jail in this state," a downtown criminal law-
yer told me, "as long as there are no drugs involved."
I mention this bit of recent family history not because it is unusual,
but because it is not. Every day, in courtrooms around the nation, cases
like this end with the defendants being placed on probation, sent into
diversion programs, or - perhaps most commonly - not prosecuted at all.
At every stage up to the trial, state actors have discretion to drop prose-
cution, reduce the charges, or approve probation or diversion. That dis-
t Professor of Law, University of Tennessee. J.D., Yale Law School, 1985; B.A., Uni-
versity of Tennessee, 1982. Thanks to Ken White, Carol Guthrie and Brent Snyder for excel-
lent research assistance. Thanks also to Doug Blaze and Neil Cohen for their helpful
comments.
"t Clay S. Conrad is an attorney in private practice in Houston, Texas. After graduating
with honors from the University of Texas Law School, he served as staff attorney for the
Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association. Mr. Conrad's writings have appeared in the
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cretion is almost entirely unreviewable. It is also almost entirely without
remark or inquiry.
Had my brother's case made it to a jury, a conviction would have
been likely. The prosecutor and judge, however, apparently felt that jus-
tice would not be served by sending the son of a local business leader -
even one with prior offenses on his record - off to jail. Yet strangely
enough, the notion that a jury might have discretion to make the same
kind of judgment appears shocking, even un-American, to many. Jurors
are unaccountable, after all (though prosecutors and judges are not espe-
cially accountable either, and are also shielded by absolute immunity).'
Historically, this trust of prosecutors and judges over jurors is a rel-
atively recent innovation, and it may not be entirely merited. Despite all
the famous cases of alleged juror nullification, it is "prosecutorial nullifi-
cation" - more commonly known as "prosecutorial discretion" - that
plays the greatest part in keeping malefactors out of jail. Given that both
kinds of nullification exist, which is more likely to constitute an abuse of
discretion, or to take place in opposition to the values of the community?
As Clay S. Conrad's book makes clear, the answer is not as easy as most
modem discussion would have it.2
I. IN THE BEGINNING
Jury nullification has probably existed in some form for as long as
there have been juries, which means it dates at least to the twelfth cen-
tury and the Assize of Clarendon, when jury trials became mandatory in
criminal matters after Pope Innocent I barred clergy from participating
in trials by ordeal.3 Conrad, however, says that juries became important
protectors of individual rights only in the seventeenth century, when they
began to resist the depredations of the Star Chamber and when they
showed reluctance to enforce the so-called "Bloody Codes" that imposed
the death penalty even for minor offenses. 4
Such resistance and reluctance came at a price. Jurors had long
faced intimidation, and even outright coercion, from authorities eager to
secure convictions in high profile cases. As Conrad reports, jurors who
voted to acquit in The Trial of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton were jailed
I See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (Judge who approved
sterilization of "somewhat retarded" 15-year-old girl in exparte proceeding held immune from
suit, because he had not acted in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction").
2 CLAY S. CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF A DocmNE (1998).
3 See id. at 17. Actually, it was not quite this simple. For an uncomfortable period after
the end of ordeals, there was literally no legal way to try many crimes until the institution of
juries filled the breach. For an interesting history of this period, and of the jury generally, see
LEONARD W. LEVY, THE PALLADIuM OF JUSTICE: ORIGN's OF TRIAL By JuRY (1999). Indeed,
this slim and elegant volume makes an excellent companion to Conrad's lengthier analysis.
4 See CONRAD, supra note 2, at 21-24, 205-07.
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and fined two thousand pounds, a phenomenal sum in those days.5 This
began to change when the Levellers, a proto-Constitutional movement in
the first half of the seventeenth century, started to push for such innova-
tions as universal male suffrage, religious tolerance, and the notion that
legitimate political power derives from the people.6 Such ahead-of-their-
time ideas also produced considerable official displeasure, which may be
why the Levellers also propagandized concerning the right of juries to
acquit without judicial supervision. At his trial for treason in 1649, Lev-
eller John Lilburne argued that jurors had the right to acquit in the inter-
ests of justice and won acquittal despite the disagreement of the court.7
But the opinion of Chief Justice John Vaughan of the Court of Com-
mon Pleas, in the celebrated Bushell's Case of 1670, marked the real sea-
change in judicial attitudes toward juries.8 Bushell's Case arose from the
trial of Quakers William Penn and William Mead for the capital offenses
of unlawful and tumultuous assembly, disturbance of the peace, and riot.9
The jury acquitted Penn and Mead of trumped-up charges in a trial that
can only be described as a travesty of justice (at one point Penn and
Mead were bound and gagged for making legal arguments that the court
disliked). 10 Even after being imprisoned without food, drink, or toilet
facilities, the jury refused to convict. 1 Several jurors, Edward Bushell
among them, refused to pay a fine and remained in jail until freed by a
writ of Habeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum issued by the Court of Common
Pleas.12 In granting the writ, the Court stressed that jurors were permit-
ted to disagree with the trial judge regarding the weight of evidence,
credibility of witnesses, and so on, making it impossible for a court to
say that the jury had decided the case "wrongly." 13
After Bushell's Case, the notion of juries as guarantors of liberty,
not mere triers of fact under the supervision of judges and prosecutors,
became embedded in the common law. It found particularly fertile
ground in the American colonies, peopled as they were with refugees
from the tyranny and turmoil that marked seventeenth-century En-
5 See id. at 21-22.
6 See id. at 23-24.
7 See id.
8 HOwELL'S STATE TRIALs 6:999 (1670), discussed in CONRAD, supra note 2, at 24-28
[hereinafter HoWELL].
9 The Trial of Wm. Penn and Wm. Mead for Causing a Tumuilt .... HOWELL 6:951
(1670), cited in CONRAD, supra note 2, at 24. After being locked out of their London meeting
house by the police, Penn preached to a crowd of 300 to 400 Quakers in Grace Church Street.
See id. at 24-25. For a dramatic account of the trial of Penn and Mead and the treatment of the
jury in that case, see GODFREY LEHmIAN, TR ORDEAL OF EDWARD BUSHELL (1988).
10 See CONRAD, supra note 2, at 25.
11 See id.
12 See id. at 27.
13 See id. at 24-28.
2000]
688 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 9:685
gland,' 4 refugees not particularly friendly to government power in gen-
eral. With such landmark cases as the trial of Peter Zenger, in which
lawyer Alexander Hanilton secured an acquittal by arguing to the jury -
against the court's instructions - that it was empowered to judge not only
the fact of publication but also the seditiousness of the speech, trial by
jury was regarded by Americans as a bulwark against tyranny beyond
Revolutionary times, and into the first half of the nineteenth century.' 5
As Leonard Levy informs us, "[b]y the era of the American Revolu-
tion, trial by jury was probably the most common right in all the colo-
nies. Americans saw it as a basic guarantor of individual freedom."' 16
This role as guarantor was based on juries' ability to find both the law
and the facts. Again, according to Levy, "[w]hen juries sat, they con-
trolled justice. In 1771 John Adams confided to his diary that a jury
could determine the law no matter how a court instructed it. A juror had
to follow his own understanding, Adams believed, even if 'in direct op-
position to the direction of the court.""-7
Nor did this change after the Revolution. As Levy notes "[d]uring
the controversy over the ratification of the Constitution, trial by jury re-
ceived extreme acclamations,"' 18 with Federalists and Anti-Federalists
vying with one another in their praises for independent juries, and with
both groups displaying a growing realization of the importance of juries
in civil as well as criminal cases. 19
The erosion of jury independence began with jurors' nullification of
the unpopular Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.20 The widespread unwilling-
ness of juries to convict made that act difficult to enforce and prompted
the beginnings of efforts to circumvent jury resistance.2' This phenome-
non of undermining jury independence because of their unwillingness to
convict under laws they considered unjust, was accelerated by the prose-
cution of labor leaders in the late nineteenth century and by efforts (de-
structive but ineffective) to enforce Prohibition.22 In each case,
authorities saw the unwillingness of juries to convict as a reflection upon
14 See DAVID HACKETr FISHCER, ALBION'S SEED: FOUR BRITISH FOLKWAYS IN AMERICA
(1989) (describing American anti-government sentiment's roots in settlement by escapees
from British political and religious turmoil).
15 See CONRAD, supra note 2, at 32-38; see also LEVY, supra note 3, at 79-81.
16 LEVY, supra note 3, at 85.
'7 Id. at 87.
18 Id. at 92.
19 See id. at 91-104.
20 See CONRAD, supra note 2, at 79-82.
21 See id. at 82-83. Juries were so reluctant to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act that many
federal judges began to admonish jurors in such cases not to vote their consciences. See id.
For an account of the Federal Judiciary's reaction to the frequent acquittals in cases brought
under the Fugitive Slave Act, see ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975).
22 See CONRAD, supra note 2, at 106-15.
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the juries, rather than upon the legitimacy of the laws they were enforc-
ing. In each case, too, the response was to control the makeup and in-
struction of jury panels so as to maximize the likelihood of conviction, a
trend that continues today in the practice of "death qualifying" jurors - a
practice that, unsurprisingly, Conrad regards as deeply suspect.23
II. THE WORLD AS WE KNOW IT
Conrad's most difficult hurdle, emotionally if not factually, is the
belief among many that allowing juries to acquit based on their own
sense of justice will lead to racist verdicts of acquittal in cases of Klan
violence and similar crimes. Is this true? Yes, according to Conrad - so
long as the juries are selected from racially-segregated jury pools, and
trials are overseen by judges and prosecutors with sympathies for the
defendants, who, along with cooperative law enforcement officers, do
their best to ensure that racist murderers escape convictions. 24 And, in
an extended analysis of many famous cases in which white juries acquit-
ted white defendants charged with racially motivated murders, Conrad
makes a convincing case that the juries were the smallest part of the
problem, serving more as a symptom than a cause of racism in the crimi-
nal justice system.25 As Conrad points out, hardly any lynching cases
were prosecuted at all; when they were, it was usually because outside
pressure forced local officials to go through the motions of prosecuting,
which typically is all they did.26 In the context of the Emmett Till case
he notes:
Sheriff Strider, proudly racist and willing to commit per-
jury in order to protect Bryant and Milam, certainly did
his part to avoid a conviction. The prosecution never
attempted to move the case out of virulently racist Tal-
lahatchie County. The methods of jury selection that
23 See id. at 236-37. Conrad writes:
Courts have interfered with the role of the jury purportedly because juries have not
uniformly punished comparably situated offenders. As in cases of racial violence,
however, courts have not been willing to critically or objectively scrutinize the role
of judges or prosecuting attorneys in capital cases. Those studies which have done
so have determined that the lion's share of the disparities involved in capital cases
are attributable to those other actors in the system, with the' single largest proportion
being due to disparate charging decisions made by prosecutors .... If the power of
the state to kill people is a legitimate part of the law of the land, it should not require
a complicated series of arcane and hypertechnical jury control procedures in order to
function.
Id.
24 See id. at 167-203.
25 See id.
26 See id. at 179-81.
20001
690 CORNELL JOuRNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 9:685
created an all-white jury in a county that was predomi-
nantly black were never questioned.27
Under such circumstances, to blame the jury alone seems a bit too
convenient for the other parties involved - and to blame juries generally
seems wholly unjustified. In Conrad's words:
Violently racist communities cannot help but seat vio-
lently racist jurors. It would be unrealistic to expect oth-
erwise. That, however, is only part of the story.
Violently racist communities cannot help but elect vio-
lently racist legislators, sheriffs, judges, and prosecutors.
There is no reason to expect the jury to be any worse
than the other actors in the system.28
This very short historical summary leaves us at an interesting place.
In truth, not many lawyers or scholars disagree with Conrad's thesis as a
matter of law. It is widely agreed that juries have the power to refuse to
convict - or, in civil cases, to refuse to render a verdict for the plaintiff -
where they believe that the result would be unjust, or inconsistent with
their view of what the law is or should be. Such experts as Levy, Judge
David Bazelon, and John Henry Wigmore, certainly no wide-eyed fanat-
ics of the Patriot Movement, all support this view.29
The real question is not whether juries can do this, but whether they
should be told that they can do this.30 And not just whether they can be
told by courts or lawyers. As Conrad recounts, those who attempt to
27 Id. at 181.
28 Id. at 202.
29 See LEVY, supra note 3. Wigmore wrote:
The jury, in the privacy of its retirement, adjusts the general rule of law to the justice
of the particular case. Thus the odium of inflexible rules of law is avoided, and
popular satisfaction is preserved .... That is what the jury trial does. It supplies that
flexibility of legal rules which is essential to justice and popular contentment.
John H. Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of Jury Trial, 12 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 170 (1929),
quoted in CONRAD, supra note 2, at 112.
30 And sometimes, the question is even whether they can be told things that might lead
them to wonder about whether they can do it. For example, in the trial of AIDS victim and
medical-marijuana activist Peter McWilliams, U.S. District Judge George H. King not only
forbade a medical-necessity defense, but went on to bar any evidence regarding McWilliams'
medical condition or reason for growing marijuana. Since McWilliams had already admitted
growing the marijuana in the expectation that he would be able to present the reasons, Judge
King's actions in preventing him from presenting such a defense left him in an untenable
position - worse off than the bound-and-gagged William Penn, since in Penn's case the jury
knew what the real issue was, while in McWilliams' case it was left unable to distinguish
between McWilliams and a garden-variety drug dealer. An account of the trial is on McWil-
liams' website, . See also Wendy Kaminer, Wizen Congress Plays Doctor, AMERICAN PROS-
PECr, Jan. 3, 2000, at 8; William F. Buckley, Jr., California's Pursuit of Truth and Justice,
N.Y. PosT, Nov. 27, 1999 at 19 (describing prosecution's fear of jury nullification if facts
were known).
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inform jurors of this truth by engaging in what certainly looks like classic
First Amendment conduct, such as leafleting near courts, often find
themselves targeted for suppression by prosecutors and judges when the
subject of their leaflets is a jury's right to judge the law.31 Well, that
question, at least, should be easy. Suppression of such efforts is simply
inconsistent with the First Amendment. That the essential thesis of jury-
rights activists happens to be true is almost beside the point, since the
First Amendment protects truth and error in equal degrees outside the
context of libel. But certainly the truth of their thesis places the jury-
rights activists in a moral position that is, like their legal position, supe-
rior to that of those who would silence them.
Similarly, the efforts of courts and prosecutors to punish jurors for
nullification, chillingly described in Conrad's book, further undermine
any claim that such efforts are undertaken in the interests of justice. As
Conrad tartly notes, jurors are never prosecuted for convicting wrongly,
only for holding out for acquittal.32 With such defenders, the argument
for keeping jurors in the dark in order to promote fairness looks dubious
at best. Indeed, it seems likely, as Judge David Bazelon wrote, that
keeping juries in the dark about their powers means that
the very opposite is true. The juror motivated by
prejudice seems to me more likely to make spontaneous
use of the power to nullify, and more likely to disregard
the judge's exposition of the normally controlling legal
standards. The conscientious juror, who could make a
careful effort to consider the blameworthiness of the de-
fendant's action in light of prevailing community values,
31 See CONRAD, supra note 2, at 158-65.
32 In once instance, for example, a New York biochemist serving on a drug case held out
for acquittal, hanging the jury. He was threatened with prosecution for perjury by the jury
administrator in an effort to bully him into changing his vote (such threats are themselves
felonious, but of course are not generally prosecuted). See CONRAD, supra note 2, at 144-45.
Similarly, juror Laura Kriho was charged with contempt of court for failing to volunteer infor-
mation about an expunged conviction, though she was not asked about it during voir dire. The
prosecution came, naturally, after she refused to vote for a conviction. See id. at 247-50. As
Conrad says, "No juror in Gilpin County has ever been prosecuted after voting to convict. Just
as the Court of the Star Chamber never prosecuted a juror who voted to convict, Gilpin County
District Attorney Jim Stanley apparently only prosecutes jurors who vote to acquit." Id. at
249. Similarly, in discussing the McWilliams case, William F. Buckley notes that prosecutors
- who argued that California's medical marijuana law, Proposition 215, was irrelevant to their
case - would almost certainly have asked jurors how they had voted on that proposal, and
moved to dismiss for cause those who said they had voted for it. See Buckley, supra note 30.
Would a juror who lied about his or her vote - or simply refused to answer - have been
charged with contempt? Quite possibly. One doubts that the reverse would hold true.
2000]
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is the one most likely to obey the judge's admonition
that the jury enforce strict principles of law.33
Bazelon goes on to note that where juries decline to convict on such
grounds, it is an important source of information about the popular per-
ceptions of a law's legitimacy:
The reluctance of juries to hold defendants responsible
for violations of the prohibition laws told us much about
the morality of those laws and about the "criminality" of
the conduct they proscribed. And the same can be said
of the acquittals returned under the fugitive slave law as
well as contemporary gaming and liquor laws. A doc-
trine that can provide us with such critical insights
should not be driven underground. 34
At a time when virtually all agree we are suffering from a surfeit of
statutes and declining confidence in government, these words strike with
particular importance. 35
I find myself strongly attracted to the views of Conrad and Bazelon,
especially in this era of rapidly metastasizing federal criminal law, much
of which is passed for purely symbolic and political reasons. 36 It has
also been my experience that far more law professors express agreement
with this view in private than do so in public. Nonetheless, many in the
legal-political establishment dismiss this view as nutty, and unfairly as-
sociate it with the politics of right-wing radicals like Timothy McVeigh.
Yet in fact, the legitimacy-enhancing effects that Bazelon describes
would be far more likely to prevent the growth of alienated McVeigh-
types than most steps that have been taken in the name of antiterrorism.
So why do they generate so much hostility?
Here, I think, the answers can be found in institutional self-interest.
In theory, judge and jury are coequal in dignity. In practice, it doesn't
work that way. As Conrad notes,
33 United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, J., dis-
senting), quoted in CONRAD, supra note 2, at 127.
34 See id. at 1143-44.
35 Jonathan Rauch demonstrates the link between these two phenomena in the form of a
table showing trust in the federal government declining as a near-perfect reciprocal of the
increase in pages of federal statutes. JONATHAN RAUCH, GovERNMENT's END: WHY VASHING-
TON STOPPED WORKING 11 tbl.1.1 (1999). For more on the importance of legitimacy, and the
dangers of ignoring popular dissatisfaction with laws perceived as illegitimate, see Randy E.
Barnett, Guns, Militias, and Oklahoma City, 62 TENN. L. REv. 443 (1995).
36 These issues are dealt with at greater length in a forthcoming work. See GLENN
HARLAN REYNOLDS, DUE PROCESS WHEN EvERYTHING IS A CRIME (unpublished work in pro-
gress) (on file with author). For a discussion of the problem of metastasizing federal criminal
law, see AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZAION OF CRIMINAL LAW, THE
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW (1998).
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Jurors are probably treated more shabbily than any other
participants in the criminal justice system - they are em-
barrassingly underpaid, often made to work hours that
not one of them would choose, and given no say at all as
to their working hours or conditions. They are simply
told to sit down, shut up, and take orders.37
This is certainly true, as any lawyer can attest. Indeed, to dramatize
the relative status of the allegedly coequal judge and jury, one need only
contrast the dreariness of most jury rooms with the opulence of most
judicial chambers.
There are simple reasons for this, readily explainable in terms of
collective action problems. Judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers are
repeat players. They are able to sanction one another informally for ob-
jectionable behavior, and they are in a good position to lobby for public
benefits and to support one another's lobbying efforts that aggrandize
their positions. Jurors, on the other hand, are not repeat players. Indeed,
it is this fact, in particular, that makes the jury system such a potent
counter to official corruption. Though jurors are occasionally furious
when not informed about, for example, mandatory minimum sentences,
there is not much they can do. Naturally, they lose out - not only in
terms of quality of life, but in terms of power and prestige. This also
becomes self-reinforcing. The worse jurors are treated, the more people
with influence try to avoid jury duty, making legal and procedural disre-
gard for jury prerogatives even less costly for the repeat players. This
process seems to have driven the status and power of juries ever-down-
ward, limited only by constitutional minima, which Conrad strongly sug-
gests we have reached or even passed.,
Ill. EMPOWERING JURIES
There is nothing terribly profound in these observations; others have
made them before.38 Scholars have also offered a number of sensible
37 See CONRAD, supra note 2, at 258. Conrad also notes that jurors are asked to give up
their privacy, both in terms of obtrusive questioning during voir dire and, in high stakes cases,
even being shadowed by lawyers and private investigators - or even FBI agents who question
neighbors and acquaintances. See id. at 259 (citing JEaFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE
JURY SYSTEM AND T=E IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 149-54 (1994)). Few lawyers would dare to
have a judge shadowed by an investigator in the hopes of turning up something disqualifying!
Contrast judges' general willingness to allow such invasions with the federal bench's response
to efforts to make their financial disclosure forms, required by law to be public, available over
the Internet. See Joe Stephens, Panel Keeps U.S. Judges' Investment Files Secret, WASH.
POST, Dec. 11, 1999 at A12 (describing federal courts' unwillingness to release federal judges'
financial information - already available to the public by law - to online news service that
intends to post that information on the Web).
38 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DA-
vis L. REv. 1169 (1995).
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suggestions for reform, such as requiring service without accepting ex-
cuses, eliminating peremptory strikes, and assigning support staff to ju-
ries.39 All of these are excellent suggestions, and as far as I am
concerned they should be adopted. But it seems likely to me that their
impact will be less than most proponents hope. So I have a more radical
proposal.
Why do lawyers fear judges? Because judges have the power to
harm them: overtly, by contempt-of-court rulings, or covertly, by bias in
ruling on evidentiary and procedural issues. (Though such bias would
seem to be a violation of judges' oaths, no one seems to think it espe-
cially rare.) Why do judges fear lawyers? Because lawyers have the
power to harm them: overtly, via moves for disqualification or removal,
or (in the case of elected judges) by running against them or supporting
those who do; or covertly, via courthouse gossip and "background" con-
versations with reporters. 40 Why do neither particularly fear jurors? Be-
cause there is not much they can do - and what power jurors have ends
when the verdict comes in, leaving no room for retribution if they have
been misled or mistreated during the proceedings.
One solution would be to make jurors repeat players, but doing so
would obviate the important role of juries as outside checks on the legal
establishment. What we need is a way for juries to function like repeat
players, without jurors themselves becoming repeat players. As it hap-
pens, there may be a way to accomplish this: reputation-rating by jurors.
At some point shortly after the verdict (but long enough afterward for
any misdirection of the jury to be discovered), jurors should rate the
prosecutors, judge and defense lawyers for honesty and fairness. The
results of such ratings should be made available to the public and - in
particular - to all future juries in cases where those players take part.
Imagine the effect: jurors who convict a defendant only to discover, too
late, that they were misled (say in cases like McWilliams') can so indi-
cate. Prosecutors and judges who keep such important information from
juries will soon work themselves out of a job for all practical purposes,
since juries will come to regard them with a jaundiced eye. Except, of
course, that as soon as such ratings exist the underlying behavior will
change.
39 See id.
40 This is also why juries get a disproportionate share of the blame from institutional
players. Consider Los Angeles District Attorney Gil Garcetti's reaction to the acquittal of 0.
J. Simpson. He might have attributed the acquittal to (1) incompetence on the part of Judge
Ito; (2) incompetence on the part of his office; (3) underhandedness on the part of the defense;
(4) actual innocence on the part of the defendant (admittedly a stretch); or (5) incompetence on
the part of the jury. Naturally, as Conrad points out, he picked (5). The jury, after all, couldn't
strike back. Judge Ito could. Even Johnnie Cochran could. Since blaming himself and his
office was out, guess who that left? See CONRAD, supra note 2, at xx-xxi.
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Such reputation ratings are now used, in various forms, in the online
world. But while their use in internet auctions or discussion fora like
http://slashdot.org may make substantial technical demands (and require
us to overcome the anonymity of internet participants), application of
such a system to juries could readily be done with pencils and paper.
(Not, you understand, that I have any objection to the use of computers).
Nor is there any real potential for injustice. Jurors, after all, are
supposed to represent (indeed, to embody) the people. What possible
objection could there be to having the people rate the performance of
their servants? And that's what judges, prosecutors, and even defense
lawyers (in their capacity as officers of the court) are, though one would
seldom grasp this from their behavior. Furthermore, the sort of institu-
tionalized approach that I suggest would replicate the informal checks
present in smaller communities where lawyers, prosecutors, and judges
develop reputations that are known to jurors before they are ever called
to service, because they are known to the community at large. If such
reputations, occurring in the small Jeffersonian communities of yore, did
not pose constitutional problems, then it is hard to see why replicating
their effects could do so today.
In fact, in states with elected judges such ratings could even help
promote judicial independence. Right now, elected judges are vulnerable
to public relations-based attacks that distort decisions or take them out of
context. The response to such attacks is to say, correctly, that a trial
cannot be summed up in a thirty-second commercial. But juries, who sit
through the entire trial, are in a far better position to judge. And surely a
judge whose juror-rating is high would better be able to withstand unfair
campaign advertisements than one without juror-ratings to fall back on.
Such ratings, consisting of close observation by ordinary people over an
extended period of time, should prove far more persuasive than attack
advertisements.
I must confess that when I have mentioned this idea to prosecutors
and criminal defense lawyers the response has been largely negative -
though perhaps more so from prosecutors than from the defense bar.
That established interests oppose this suggestion, of course, does not by
itself prove that it is a good idea. But it certainly suggests that getting it
adopted will require overcoming the opposition of the existing repeat
players in our system.
However, given the miserable state of our present criminal justice
system, it is unclear how much weight the concerns of its principals de-
serve. As unfolding scandals in every big city illustrate, murder of in-
nocents, planting of evidence, and perjury by police officers - all winked
at by prosecutors who depend on the cooperation of police - is ram-
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pant.41 Such abuses can no longer be described as the occasional errant
behavior of a few bad apples; they are systemic and deeply embedded.
At the same time, many crimes go unpunished, even untried, in those
same cities - and there is a suspicious correlation between the wealth and
fame of defendants and the likelihood that they will escape prosecution.
Given that the current criminal justice system is failing both at con-
victing the guilty and at protecting the innocent, perhaps it is time for a
significant change. Reempowering the jury, through both appropriately
couched nullification instructions and other structural mechanisms, is
likely to improve the situation considerably. Considering the truly mis-
erable record of the criminal justice system in recent years, the burden
should be on its defenders to explain why such a change is not in order.
Perhaps Conrad's book, which sets out the arguments for jury power in
eloquent and meticulously documented form, will finally bring about se-
rious discussion of the jury's proper role.
41 See Bob Herbert, Criminal Justice Breakdown, N.Y. TimEs, Feb. 14, 2000, at A21
(citing Ramparts police scandal in Los Angeles, where over 30 convictions have already been
overturned due to police-manufactured evidence; Illinois, where 13 death row inmates have
been exonerated; and Texas, which executed a man, David Wayne Spence, whom even the
investigating officer believed innocent; and Washington , D.C., where the police department
has been indicted for "a pattern of reckless and indiscriminate gunplay by officers sent into the
streets with inadequate training and little oversight'). Herbert concludes that "[f]rom coast to
coast the criminal justice system is riddled with the horrors of incompetence and worse." Id.
See also Scott Glover and Matt Lait, Police in Secret Group Broke Law Routinely, Transcripts
Say, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2000, at Al (describing police officers repeatedly planting guns or
drugs on suspects, and orchestrating the deportation of illegal immigrants who witnessed po-
lice misconduct to prevent their testifying about it in court).
